Renewed US focus on the Asia Pacific region will come with expectations that New Zealand increase its defence spending, writes Dr Wayne Mapp. How should we respond?
President Trump has been in office for nearly two months. In that time, he has certainly upset the status quo. In many respects he has done just as he said he would do during the presidential campaign.
But in other respects, President Trump has gone much further, most notably by treating allied states not as partners, but as client states expected to do as he requires and for the enrichment of the United States. This threatens to shred the NATO alliance.
It is worth considering how things have got to this state. Many Americans, especially those in the MAGA orbit, want to retreat to Fortress America, free from foreign entanglements, except where there is commercial and cultural advantage. From their perspective the last 100 years has bled both American lives and treasure, with no commensurate gain.
Europe stands out, being the major source of the two world wars. The wars of the former Yugoslavia and the more recent war in Ukraine demonstrate to them that Europe is still a fractious region. Rather than the Trans-Atlantic Alliance being a primary source of American economic and strategic leadership, it is seen by many Americans as an economic drain that diminishes American autonomy.
“Defence alliances carry obligations as well as benefits. The test for New Zealand now is whether it will boost defence spending in the same manner that Australia has done over the last decade.”
From this perspective, the United States needs to withdraw from Europe, including the irksome obligations of NATO.
The expectation that Europe should collectively shoulder the lion’s share of European security has been an ongoing theme for decades. President Trump, and his Vice President, neither of whom have much patience with the idea of collective defence, have aggressively advanced this expectation. Collective defence in the model of NATO is seen as a game for suckers, where the weak draw from the strong, without any advantage for the strong, who are quite capable of dealing with any direct threats without assistance.
President Trump’s penchant to treat all security issues, other than those directly affecting the United States, as merely transactional and devoid of reference to shared values is likely to have a profound impact on existing global security arrangements.
If this administration can upend decades of predictable alliance arrangements, can alliance partners continue to rely on the United States, not just during this administration, but also in the future? If United States security policy can so fundamentally change with each administration, what is the point of being in alliance with the United States?
Thus far, the Trump administration’s strategic change is aimed at Europe. The premise being that Europe is economically and militarily strong enough to look after itself, especially against a weakened Russia.
Unlike all other United States led alliances, Europe has its own nuclear deterrent in the form of the French and British nuclear forces. France has already offered to extend its nuclear deterrent to the rest of Europe. If Europe were to form a European Defence Alliance, backed with a substantial increase in defence spending, then such an alliance could provide effective collective defence for the whole of Europe, including the exposed Baltic states.
Would Russia risk attacking the Baltic states if it knew it was going to be exposed to the equivalent of a NATO Article V response, whereby all European nations in the alliance militarily respond to such an attack, including with direct attacks on Russian territory?
To what extent does the NATO debacle signal the same tumultuous future for the rest of United States security arrangements, especially those in the Asia Pacific, within which New Zealand belongs?
It is worth noting the fundamental differences between the Asia Pacific and Europe. The United States has direct territorial possessions right across the Pacific, stretching from Hawaii to Guam. Within New Zealand’s area of the South West Pacific, the United States has American Samoa, a point that will be particularly well understood by the new Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, who was born in American Samoa. Her husband is Maori Samoan and is originally from Auckland.
There is also a fundamental difference in the nature of peer competition. Unlike Russia, China is a virtual equal of the United States. The economies of China and the United States are of similar size. China is the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods. China has 1.4 billion people, ten times more than that of Russia, and it now has the world’s second largest defence expenditure.
Australia and New Zealand have just witnessed the growing extent of China’s naval reach. It was a demonstration of power that would not have been possible a decade ago.
It is therefore not surprising that President Trump and his team have declared that their primary focus is on the Asia Pacific. In this he continues in the path of successive United States administrations. However, President Trump has also mooted that he sees an opportunity for the United States to strike a grand bargain with China.
Based on the European precedent, this is likely to be heedless of the security interests of the other nations within the region.
Such a prospect will be of particular concern for the nations of East Asia and South East Asia, all of whom are proximate to China. It is not difficult to imagine that the United States and China might agree to divide the Asia Pacific into spheres of interest, with the two nations having their primary influence in different parts of the Asia Pacific.
New Zealand has two ANZAC frigates. Close enough to a one fifth ratio of the Australians. Image: NZDF.
However, this presupposes that the other countries in the region are without agency. Japan, for instance, would not accept being under the influence of China. Vietnam, who has fought successful wars against both China and the United States, will not surrender its independence to any nation.
Given this reality, a grand bargain between China and the United States would be less about determining how other nations act, but more about how the two great nations act with each other. The intent would be to reduce the direct friction between China and the United States in return for more mutually advantageous commercial relationships between them.
How can Australia and New Zealand respond to this change in the security environment?
The first point to note is the nature of the alliance relationships that each country has. Australia’s most important ally, by far, is the United States. Unlike Europe, Australia can’t easily go it alone. Australia simply doesn’t have the population or economy that would allow it to do so. From the United States perspective, Australia is the bulwark of the West Pacific, providing depth and capability that no Pacific island territory can do.
The mutual depth of this relationship is evident from the fact that the United States has agreed that it will ensure Australia can acquire up to six nuclear submarines. The only other country that the United States has shared this technology is Britain. It seems inconceivable that the United States would abandon Australia as an ally. There is no vexed history as there has been with much of Europe.
For New Zealand, the only ally is Australia. New Zealand has an extensive defence partnership with the United States, but since 1987, with the anti-nuclear standoff, New Zealand has not been a formal ally of the United States. The defence alliance between Australia and New Zealand, formalised in the Canberra Pact of 1944, has its antecedents stretching back the Treaty of Waitangi.
In essence, the existing defence arrangements of each country will remain. If the United States actually increases its focus on the Asia Pacific, we may expect these arrangements to be intensified. There is a potential silver lining in President Trump’s ambitions. If the United States is able to conclude a grand bargain with China, then the extensive commercial arrangements that both Australia and New Zealand have with China will remain largely unaffected.
Nevertheless, there will be implications for New Zealand’s defence spending.
Defence alliances carry obligations as well as benefits. The test for New Zealand now is whether it will boost defence spending in the same manner that Australia has done over the last decade. This is not necessarily increasing defence expenditure to the same level of GDP as Australia, but rather retaining a degree of proportionality that has hitherto existed.
Australia is progressively increasing its defence expenditure to 2.5% of GDP. On this basis, New Zealand might be expected to increase expenditure to close to 2% of GDP.
For many decades, in key strategic military assets, New Zealand has maintained a proportionate contribution to that of Australia. Typically, it is a one fifth ratio. This has been the case with maritime patrol aircraft (the ratio for MPA has been closer to one third), with naval surface combatants and with special forces. Of course, with defence expenditure exceeding 2% of GDP, Australia has many capabilities that New Zealand simply does not have, including advanced combat aircraft, airborne early warning aircraft and submarines.
This long held ratio is now at risk, especially in the naval surface combatant fleet. Currently Australia has nine surface combatants, with three air warfare destroyers and six ANZAC frigates (out of an original eight with two having already been withdrawn from service). New Zealand has two ANZAC frigates. Close enough to a one fifth ratio of the Australians.
However, Australia is about to embark on a major increase in its surface fleet, with six new Type 26 ASW frigates and eleven general purpose frigates to replace the ANZAC ships. Within a decade the Australian Navy will have twenty surface combatants. To maintain the longstanding one fifth ratio would require New Zealand to have four frigates, even though they will only in the lowest tier of general purpose frigates.
Prime Minister Luxon has indicated that defence expenditure will progressively increase to 2% of GDP. Acquiring four general purpose frigates to replace the two ANZAC frigates will achieve this goal.
New Zealand’s alliance with Australia is going to be tested. Australia is fully committed to its alliance with the United States and will do whatever is necessary to keep it in good order. That will almost certainly mean an increase in Australian defence expenditure. There will be an expectation, especially from Australia, that New Zealand will follow the same imperative: that as Australia does what is necessary to maintain its alliance with the United States, so will New Zealand with respect to the Trans-Tasman alliance.
It won’t be just defence expenditure. There is also AUKUS Pillar Two. New Zealand’s engagement with AUKUS will need to be about the Trans-Tasman Alliance – more than the broader strategic issues – if it to receive public acceptance.
The expectations around the strategic arrangements of Australia and New Zealand are mutually reinforcing. The actions of each partner strengthen the whole.
A renewed commitment by New Zealand to its alliance with Australia is more urgent than it has been for many decades. The recent display of Chinese naval strength in the Tasman Sea shows the relevance of Australia and New Zealand having the capability to protect our immediate region. A Trans-Tasman fleet of 24 surface combatants, with 20 from Australia and 4 from New Zealand, would be a formidable deterrent to any would be adversaries venturing into our region.
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