Being seen as a reliable security partner will be one way to ensuring our overall relationship with the US remains in good shape. With the Trump administration, however, the reverse is also likely to be true, writes Dr Wayne Mapp.
The election of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the United States will send reverberations throughout the United States’ security partners.
In his last term of office President Trump put substantial pressure on members of the NATO alliance to meet the agreed 2% defence spending target. United States allies, including Australia and Japan, also increased their defence spending.
The international security situation is substantially more difficult than it was in 2016. During the election campaign President Trump said he would end the current wars and would not start new wars.
President Trump will test the international security system in two ways. First, he will demand clear commitments from allies and partners in respect of United States initiatives – effectively a new hegemony where there can be no doubt which side the allies and partners are on. Second, as a consequence of the first, a greater commitment to building up strong defence forces.
“Being an unreliable partner will have its own set of consequences. This may be evident in the selective application of tariffs and quota restrictions on New Zealand’s primary exports to the United States.”
The team that President Trump has chosen, notably Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Congressman Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor, believe deeply that the United States defence forces must have unparalleled strength. All allies and partners will be expected to conform to this expectation and to build up their own defence forces in to enhance overall security.
In short, the intent is that the defence forces of the western alliance are so strong that any potential adversary will be deterred from military action and will be willing to negotiate.
Within NATO, President Trump has already indicated that the new goal for defence spending will be 3% of GDP. Other allies and partners will also be expected to increase their defence spending.
What are the implications for New Zealand?
New Zealand is not a formal ally of the United States, but it is hard to imagine that New Zealand will be immune from the pressure to show our commitment to the western alliance, and to increase defence spending. In our case this pressure won’t only come from the United States, it will also come from our only ally, Australia.
It is clear that Prime Minister Luxon is fully aware of the coming expectations. In his speech to the Lowy Institute in August 2024, Prime Minister Luxon made it clear that the Asia Pacific region had increased strategic competition and that as a consequence New Zealand had greater obligations to its security partners.
He specifically committed to “bolster shared security”. This included being a “credible and effective partner and ally”.
The Prime Minister made reference to the upcoming Defence Capability Plan (DCP) with the intent that it would include investment in new capability. More recently the Prime Minister has indicated that the DCP would require increased defence spending.
Much of the focus on New Zealand’s relationship with the United States will be on the quality of the security relationship. Will the United States perceive New Zealand to be a reliable security partner?
While past commitments always matter in these considerations, it is the future that is the real testing ground. AUKUS Pillar Two will be the crux of the test. Making a commitment to join will ensure New Zealand meets the test.
That will be seen to be the case in both Australia and the United States. Conversely, failing to join would be an indication of unreliability. Leaving after having joined, as the Labour opposition has indicated, would amplify the perception of unreliability.
Those of us who were around in the late 1980s after the ANZUS rift will well recall the frigid circumstances on security issues that New Zealand found itself in. It took two decades, from the early 1990s to around 2010 with the Wellington and Washington Declarations, before the security relationship with the United States was fully repaired.
While AUKUS Pillar Two may not have the drama of the ANZUS rift, it is hard to imagine that New Zealand would be immune to adverse consequences if it failed to join, particularly if Canada and Japan were to join AUKUS Pillar Two. New Zealand would be the odd one out.
Being seen as a reliable security partner will be one way to ensuring the overall relationship with the United States remains in good shape. With the Trump administration, however, the reverse is also likely to be true.
Being an unreliable partner will have its own set of consequences. This may be evident in the selective application of tariffs and quota restrictions on New Zealand’s primary exports to the United States. This sort of penalty was never applied during the ANZUS rift, but an administration as transactional as the Trump administration is likely to be, may have no such qualms in applying this type of penalty.
It won’t be enough to keep the formal security partnerships in good order. There will be the expectation that New Zealand will increase its defence spending. This is also likely to be part of the means to defray the prospect of harmful tariffs.
I have previously noted in this column that replacing existing capabilities, most notably the Navy, on a like for like basis will require defence spending to increase to 1.5% of GDP, up from the current 1.3% of GDP.
When the Labour/New Zealand First government purchased the P8 Poseidon’s and the C130J Hercules, defence spending did increase to 1.5% of GDP for 2020 and 2021. The naval replacement programme will be substantially more expensive. New Zealand’s defence partners are unlikely to be convinced by a programme that merely replaces platforms of a one for one basis.
Australia is particularly notable for the very substantial increase in the size of its Navy over the last decade. They, along with the United States, will expect New Zealand to take at least some steps toward increasing capability. I have previously mooted an increase in the naval combat force from two frigates to either three or four such ships. This will require an increase in defence spending to up to 2% of GPD, which is still less than that of Australia.
The DCP is the most likely lens in which to signal such an increase in defence spending. With the Trump administration taking office on 20 January 2025, there may be a case for the DCP to provide for more than one option in the replacement of key capabilities. For instance, the option of either two, three or four naval combat ships, with the appropriate costings for each option.
The government will then have the basis to make realistic choices depending on how the strategic situation, including the expectations of New Zealand’s defence partners, evolves over the next year or two.
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