Building New Zealand’s Future Navy: Beyond ‘like for like’ replacement

Line of Defence Magazine - Spring 2021

Babcock Arrowhead 140
Flexibility for configuration: the Babcock Arrowhead 140. Image: Babcock.

The need to replace half of the RNZN’s fleet by the mid 2030s presents a rare opportunity to move away from simply considering like for like replacements, writes Editor-at-large Peter Greener, and to consider newer and fewer classes.

Dr Peter Greener is Line of Defence Magazine’s Editor-at-large, a Senior Fellow at the University of Victoria Wellington’s Centre for Strategic Studies, and an Honorary Professor at the NZDF Command and Staff College. Read more about Peter here.

This article is part of Line of Defence Magazine’s Future Navy Series, featuring expert commentary on the capability decisions that will shape the future Royal New Zealand Navy.

At a time when the economy continues to face the costs imposed by the Covid – 19 pandemic it may seem premature to be exploring opportunities for building the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) of the future, but now is the very time to be doing so. 

Over the next ten to fifteen years, the government will need to consider replacements for the Protector class Offshore Patrol Vessels, the Anzac frigates and the dive and hydrographic support ship HMNZS Manawanui

The Defence Capability Plan 2019 (DCP19) envisaged a decision being made by 2028 for the replacement of the Offshore Patrol Vessels, with the Anzac frigates being replaced in the 2030s “with modern surface combatants relevant to New Zealand’s prevailing strategic environment”.  The dive and hydrographic capability was to see HMNZS Manawanui “replaced with a similar vessel in the mid-2030s”.

DCP19 highlighted that there would need to be “investment in all the core capabilities that have provided the foundation for New Zealand’s Defence Force for the last two decades. These high-end capabilities offer significant value to New Zealand’s security and our defence relationships.” Whilst we await a new Defence Assessment and a revised DCP, it appears that the baseline settings outlined in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018, the document that generated DCP19, still hold today. 

However, one theme identified in these documents appears even more pressing in the light of the impacts of COVID-19. Minister of Defence Peeni Henare recently noted that: “for many Pacific Islands that [economic recovery after the pandemic] means protecting the fisheries. Assisting with fisheries patrols is an important way the Royal New Zealand Navy…can help.” Maintaining a significant patrol vessel capability has thus become even more salient.

It was therefore reassuring to have Minister Henare tell the Foreign Affairs and Trade Select Committee in August this year that, “We are not cutting back on the DCP.” Secretary of Defence Andrew Bridgman added that a revised Defence Capability Plan would not mean scrapping planned projects but would rather necessitate moving them “out a bit”.

Over the past quarter century, one of the fundamental difficulties for a small Navy such as New Zealand’s has been the training and maintenance burden imposed by the requirements of each class of ships in service varying significantly. Currently with nine ships in service there are six different classes of vessel. This has been compounded by the bespoke nature of the vessels – the refitted Anzacs are now very different ships from their Australian counterparts. Some recent research has sought to identify how best to respond to the challenge of being a small Navy with a large area of responsibility. 

For example, in the inaugural edition of the Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy of December 2020, Andrew Watts published a convincing article entitled “Designing the Next Fleet.” He argued for a rationalised future Navy fleet, making a case for designing a force structure and not merely replacing like for like. 

He acknowledged that there are specialist roles that require a single class of ship – HMNZS Aotearoa, HMNZS Canterbury, and the future Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel are cited as examples. Nevertheless, at the core of his thesis is the importance of reducing the number of ship classes, promoting the concept of one fundamental ship design capable of generating several possible capabilities. 

Central to this model is the notion of modularity: “Modular installations that provide a basic ship structure and services that allow various mission packages to be installed and interchanged as needed.” Here the ship and its fundamental core systems remain unchanged – “to which a removable payload system tailored to a particular mission and level of capability is added.” 

Watts notes that this would allow the possibility of fitting a vessel out as an offshore patrol vessel; with Expeditionary Reconnaissance and Mine Counter Measures equipment (though he acknowledges the possible need for additional hydraulic systems) to undertake many littoral warfare tasks; or fully fitted out as a capable combat frigate.  

Whilst acknowledging that frigates require a high maximum speed at times, he notes that patrol vessels also need speed for interdiction and emergency response. In addition, they both need range, endurance, and good sea-keeping qualities.  “The potential for combining combat and patrol functions in a single platform able to accept modular systems for combat and/or patrol missions should thus be investigated.”

Importantly, given the amount of capital that investing in such technology requires, such platforms have been in existence for three decades now, initially with the introduction of the Danish STANFLEX system. The most recent iteration of this can be found in the Royal Navy Type 31 frigates that are currently under construction. The Babcock Arrowhead 140s are based on the modular concept of the Iver Huitfeldt class Royal Danish Navy frigates.

Built to a very tight budget limit of GBP 250 million, five of these ships are planned at a total cost of GBP 1.25 billion. Many of the required systems will be fitted later, some of them being re-purposed from the current Type 23s.  A successor to the Type 31, the Type 32, is likely to provide even more flexibility for configuration, to be designed from the outset to support autonomous technology and facilitate the deployment of mine counter measures.

What was clear in Watts’ recommendations was that no particular ship was being advocated for, but two significant points were highlighted. In choosing a ship fitted with modular systems, upgrades can be undertaken without a ship having to be taken fully out of service. The other feature is that ship availability could be higher; greater flexibility could allow for the ships to be rapidly reconfigured from combat to patrol, thus helping to manage wear on engines and other equipment. 

It is noteworthy here just how long both RNZN frigates have been unavailable over their lifetime because of their refits. Greater standardisation across a greater number of ships could also allow for “price leverage on suppliers.”

It may be that a future tender results in promising offers from the United Kingdom, Denmark, Spain, Italy, or South Korea for suitable contenders.

However, the building of four or five ships to replace three current classes of ship also provides for other significant opportunities in both a post-Covid environment and a more challenging strategic context.  

In May 2021, Finance Minister Grant Robertson, whilst visiting the revitalised Hillside railway workshops in Dunedin, stated thar he wanted to see workers involved in advanced manufacturing. “It is good for our communities, and it is good for our economy,” he said. “I want to see communities around New Zealand with manufacturing, like Hillside.” 

Defence Minister Henare earlier this year indicated that the Prime Minister was due to “go to Australia soon and we should explore complementary defence industry opportunities.” That visit may be on hold, but new possibilities for the defence industries of Australia and New Zealand remain when thinking about new ships for the RNZN. 

Whilst there was much controversy in New Zealand over the decision in 1989 to purchase the Anzac frigates built by Australia and New Zealand, what was clear ultimately was the high level of New Zealand industry participation in the project. With the frigates in the end costing close to NZ$2 billion, the total value of work awarded to firms across New Zealand was in excess of NZ$800 million. 

The renewal of half of the RNZN’s fleet presents a rare opportunity to move away from simply considering like for like replacements. Consideration of a new type of Anzac ship for New Zealand’s future Navy, based on an already proven design, may just be what would work best to meet New Zealand’s needs.

This article was first posted on Incline. View it on Incline here.

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